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Abstract
We construct a North-South Romer model of endogenous growth
in which the South is endowed with the entire stock of an essential
polluting non-renewable resource and in which world economic growth
is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pol-
lution as representing the greenhouse e￿ect, thus in￿uencing global
welfare. We ￿rst solve the optimum allocation. Then, we characterize
the optimal policy in equilibrium. Next, we examine the e￿ects of the
time-pro￿le and the levels of environmental taxes. The time-pro￿le
of the tax determines when the resource is extracted and thus the
growth rate of world output. The tax levels determine the magnitude
of world production, the location of this production and both northern
and southern consumption levels. We show that the tax levels a￿ect
the e￿ciency of the global economy through relocation, while also af-
fecting the split of total production between North and South through
both relocation and rent extraction. Finally, we completely assess the
e￿ects of an increase in the northern environmental tax level depend-
ing on both northern and southern initial environmental tax levels. In
particular, we study the northern tax’s impacts in the region of the
￿scal competition equilibrium.
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A surprising di￿erence between the top oil-producing and the top
oil-consuming countries is that the former are often poorer than the latter 1.
As a result of this heterogeneity and the related heterogeneity in productiv-
ity levels throughout the world, the North largely consumes these resources,
while the South mainly exports them.
The ￿ow extracted at any given time of such ￿nite resources will not be
available in the future. The net revenue of the extractor must re￿ect this
opportunity cost. As a consequence, in equilibrium, the di￿erence between
the price and the cost borne by the supplier is a positive rent rising according
to the rate of interest. In a world where resources are traded internationally,
this pure rent accrues to the southern resource-rich countries. Today, these
exchanges are enormous, representing a large part of North-South trade.
Most of the non-renewable energies are fossil fuels and contain a high
proportion of carbon. They are polluting in the sense that their burning in
the production process emits greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. As such,
these resources are taxed for the sake of regulating the pollution externality.
Moreover, the rising awareness of global warming engenders an ever larger
regulation of the polluting factors of production. It is now often the case
that environmental policies are implemented through the use of taxes on the
polluting goods which are speci￿cally designed for this sake.
However, due to the ￿xed nature of the stocks of such resources, their
taxation a￿ects the extraction rents received by the supplier. The economic
literature provides several interesting papers on this aspect of non-renewable
resources taxation. Among them, Bergstrom (1982) and Brander and Djajic
(1983) emphasize the possibility for a pure consuming country to extract
some of the rent to be earned by the exporting countries.
The implied redistributive aspects of environmental policies cannot be
observed in the standard integrated models used by the resource economics
literature to study the optimal taxation of polluting resources. Among them,
we refer to Schou (2000), Schou (2002), Grimaud and RougØ (2005), and
Groth and Schou (2006), who study the design of optimal policies to regulate
the pollution externality while none of the models proposed allows for the
introduction of asymmetric endowments. In Nordhaus and Boyer (2000),
which develops a multi-country model, the resource is not explicitly non-
renewable. However, the authors note in their conclusion that if the resource
supply is perfectly inelastic "(...) carbon taxes may have no economic e￿ect
at all and would simply redistribute rents from the resource owners to the
government". Since, although they cannot be observed, the redistributive
e￿ects of such taxes are thought by some economists to be signi￿cant, we
1For instance, the per capita GNI over the 19 countries with the largest crude oil
reserves per capita ￿ which overall represent more than 80% of the world reserves ￿ is
lower than 5800 US$ (sources: The World Bank, Oil & Gas Journal).
1think it is of great interest to focus directly on them.
One of the main reasons why the environmental policy can have distri-
butional consequences is the fact that consuming countries can potentially
exploit resource-rich countries through tari￿s that allow for the extraction of
rent by the former from the latter. Bergstrom (1982) notes that "if the con-
suming nations were disjoint from the producing nations, they could extract
nearly the entire economic rent from the suppliers by setting [an excise tax]
su￿ciently large". However, it appears that this rent-extraction is limited
whenever the supplying countries can use the resource domestically. This
possibility has been emphasized in Dasgupta et al. (1978) and its conse-
quence on the rent-extraction opportunities has been studied in Brander and
Djajic (1983). In the latter paper indeed the country importing the resource
is limited in the design of a tari￿ because of the threat of the supplying coun-
try to consume himself the resource. In this theory the only strategic agents
are the two planner governments that control the whole economic activity
in their respective countries.
In the present paper, the resource-poor economy (North) is also limited
in its exploitation of the resource-rich economy (South). Our interpretation
however has more to do with tax competition. Indeed our result relies on the
fact that the North faces the threat of relocation of its ￿nal good production
sector towards the South. Formally, the design of a local environmental tax
renders, in equilibrium, the resource factor relatively more or less expensive
than abroad and introduces distortions to global e￿ciency. The equalization
of the factor prices thus necessitates some move of the productive activities.
To emphasize this limit to the rent-extraction possibility, we use, contrary to
Brander and Djajic (1983) a decentralized general equilibrium framework.
In this context, each trading partner being identi￿ed respectively as
South and North, the relocation of the industry towards one of these coun-
tries may have deeper dynamic e￿ects. In North-South models, the assump-
tion that the intellectual property rights (IPRs) are not evenly enforced
throughout the world is standard. In such frameworks, the relative size of
the northern and southern productive sectors a￿ects the incentive to per-
form research. Hence, if economic growth is driven by a research sector, the
location of the industry changes the amount of investment in research. This
could have important e￿ects on world economic growth and, consequently,
on the pace of extraction of the natural resource. Using an asymmetric two-
country endogenous growth model allows us to explore this channel in the
present paper.
The purpose of our study is thus to examine the North-South e￿ects
of local environmental policies. Among them, it is worth paying special
attention to the distributional consequences of tax instruments and the dis-
tortions introduced by changes in the relative net prices of the resource in
North and South. Furthermore, we will examine the changes in the incentive
2to do research caused indirectly by the environmental taxes, through their
in￿uence on the location of world productive activities. Our analysis neces-
sitates the use of a dynamic model because of the intertemporal character of
both resource depletion and pollution accumulation. To emphasize the ￿rms’
own ability to choose their location, we need to use a decentralized general
equilibrium framework. Eventually, to understand how the incentives for
research react to the particular split of productive activities between North
and South, an endogenous growth model will be of use. Hence, we present a
two-country Romer model in which the South is endowed with all the stock
of an essential, polluting non-renewable resource and world economic growth
is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution to
represent the greenhouse e￿ect, globally a￿ecting welfare. We assume also
an asymmetry in the IPRs’ degrees of enforcement: the IPRs are perfectly
enforced in the North and not at all in the South.
In conformity with the resource economics literature, we ￿rst show that
the optimal environmental tax is de￿ned by its time-pro￿le while its initial
level does not help regulate the pollution externality. We next identify the
channels driving the e￿ects of the tax levels and decompose them in two
types. The "rent extraction" channel entails purely redistributive e￿ects:
an increase in the northern and southern tax levels by the same proportion
makes the northern households better-o￿ and the southern ones worse-o￿.
The "relocation" channel has an impact on the e￿ciency of the world econ-
omy, the size of world production and its geographic split. It ￿nally yields
that the North’s interest in extracting rent from the South is limited by the
threat of relocation to the South by the ￿nal goods sector. Symmetrically,
the South can bene￿t from an increase in the northern environmental tax
level if it is already high. We also demonstrate that, under our speci￿cation,
although the location of the ￿nal sector among North and South a￿ects the
incentives to innovate, it does not change either investment in the research
sector or world economic growth. Subsequently, we assume that both govern-
ments set their tax levels strategically, subject to the decentralized decisions
of ￿rms. Hence, in Nash equilibrium, the southern government will set a
positive tax while the northern one is limited by the threat of relocation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our model
and characterize the associated optimum allocation. Section 3 contains the
solution of the Romer equilibrium and an examination of the optimal policies.
In section 4, we analyze the e￿ects of changes in the environmental tax levels,
and in doing so distinguish between redistributive e￿ects and distortional
ones. In particular, we isolate the e￿ects of rent extraction from those of
relocation. In this section, we also introduce strategic social governments
whose control variables are the respective environmental tax levels. In this
￿scal competition game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium of the economy
under the ￿rms decentralized decisions.
32 Model and Welfare
At each date t ∈ [0,+∞), the ￿nal output is produced in both countries
using the range of available intermediate goods, labor and a ￿ow of resource.










γ, α + β + γ = 1, i = N,S, (2.1)
where xi(j) is the amount used of intermediate good j, LY
i is the quantity
of labor employed in the production sector, Ri is the quantity of natural
resource burnt in country i. The subscripts N and S refer respectively to
the North and the South.
Ai, i = N,S, is an index of technological development which measures
the range of the available innovations in each country. Only the North is
engaged in a research activity and its production of innovations is given by:
˙ AN = ψANLA
N, ψ > 0, (2.2)
where LA
N is the quantity of labor employed in the research sector. A constant
fraction φ, 0 < φ ≤ 1, of the ever discovered innovations di￿uses naturally
to the South while the remaining ones cannot be used in this country:
AS = φAN, 0 < φ ≤ 1. (2.3)
φ can be interpreted as an index of southern development.
To each available innovation is associated an intermediate good produced
in both countries through a one-for-one technology from the ￿nal output:
xi(j) = yi(j), j ∈ [0,Ai], i = N,S. (2.4)
The resource is freely extracted from a ￿nite initial stock:
˙ Q = −R = −(RN + RS), Q(0) = Q0 > 0, given, (2.5)
and its use results in a proportional ￿ow of pollution emptying a stock of
environment quality (E)3:
˙ E = −hR = −h(RN + RS), h > 0, E(0) = E0 ≥ hQ0, given. (2.6)
2For simplicity, the time argument of each variable is dropped as long as this does not
create ambiguity.
3For simplicity, we ignore the regeneration ability of the atmosphere, as for instance
in Groth and Schou (2006). From a control theoretic point of view, this de￿nition of the
level of environmental quality is made here in order to reduce the problem by one state
variable.
4Each household is endowed with one unit of labor. The total quantities




N ≤ LN, (2.7)
LY
S ≤ LS. (2.8)
The households of each country consume the amount of the ￿nal good
remaining after the production of the intermediates so that the world level
of consumption, C, must satisfy the world’s budget constraint:






xS(j)dj ≤ YN + YS. (2.9)
The preferences of the in￿nitely-lived representative households of North








e−ρt dt, i = N,S, λ,ρ > 0, (2.10)
where λ is an index of environmental concern and ρ a psychological discount
rate.













e−ρt dt, 0 < δ < 1. (2.11)




































































S(t) = gCo(t) = gY o(t) = gY o
























, 0 < δ < 1, (2.19)
which gives the distribution of the world production between both countries.
Proof of proposition 1 See appendix A.
The Pareto set can be represented by the boundary of the utility pos-
sibility set in the space of the discounted utilities of both representative
households. Then, as the utilities of the representative households only dif-
fer through the amount consumed, a change in δ, that is a change in relative
consumption levels, results in a move along the latter boundary in favor
either of the North or of the South.
Equation (2.12) gives us how the total quantity of labor in the North is
dedicated to production and research respectively. Note that the optimal
amount of labor in the research sector is constant over time. This simpli￿es
the dynamics to a large extent (see equation (2.15)). One can also remark
that the optimal labor quantity in the research sector is increasing in the
degree of knowledge di￿usion, φ. Indeed, the more southern countries bene￿t
from northern innovations, the more investment must be done in research.
4The upper-script
o is used for optimum. The growth rate of any variable X is denoted
by gX. We de￿ne global variables as follows: Y = YN +YS, C = CN +CS, R = RN +RS
and x = xN + xS while AN = A and AS = φA.
6Equation (2.16) is an intertemporal arbitrage condition known as the
Hotelling condition. It gives the optimal pace of extraction. Let us note from
this result that, as gE is technically bound to be negative, the introduction
of pollution concern in the model implies that the society has to postpone
extraction. Indeed, if λ = 0, the extraction rate is given by gR = −ρ, which
is lower than the optimal one given in (2.16)5.
The other equations come from the equalization of the marginal produc-
tivities of the factors used in the northern and the southern ￿nal sector and
from the Cobb-Douglas functional forms. In particular, equation (2.13) gives
the constant geographic repartition of the world ￿nal production. The dy-
namics of the model essentially relies on equation (2.16). Due to the constant
division of the northern labor, a part of the model behaves regularly. Hence,
the growth rates of the other variables are linear functions of the growth rate
of extraction (see equations (2.17) and (2.18). We show in appendix A that
the economy is in perpetual transition. Note from (2.16) that if there is no
pollution externality (λ = 0), the economy experiments a balanced growth
from date 0 on.
The optimal dynamics of the extraction, the environment quality and
the output is depicted in the graphs of ￿gure 1. These graphs immediately
















Figure 1: Optimal dynamics of extraction (R), environment quality (E) and 
output (Y).
ρ −
The rate of extraction, go
R, is always negative, i.e. the ￿ows of extracted
resource decreases over time. As time goes on, the rate of extraction de-
creases and its growth rate converges asymptotically to the negative value of
5This result relies essentially on the assumption that the environment does not regen-
erate. However, Withagen (1994) presents a more general model in which the same result
holds. See section 3 for further comments.
7the discount rate. Actually, the stock of resource is exhausted only asymptot-
ically as the extraction, R, decreases and tends to zero. The environmental
quality, E, decreases over time and its growth rate tends to zero asymptoti-
cally. As a result of the long term exhaustion of the non-renewable resource,
the society generates the maximum pollution. The right question is thus
when to pollute optimally instead of how much the optimal quantity of pol-
lution is. Eventually, as a consequence of the extraction path, the output
rate of growth decreases and tends to be constant asymptotically. In the
long run, growth is driven solely by the discovery of new intermediates.
3 Equilibrium, Public Policies and Pareto Optimal-
ity
3.1 The Agents Behavior
Institutions and Instruments
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium ￿ la Romer of the model
presented in the previous section.
The ￿nal good, the intermediate goods and the extracted resource are
private goods that are freely tradable across countries. We assume that
intellectual property rights are enforced in the North, while they are not in
the South. Only the southern households own the natural resource stock.
The stock of pollution is de￿ned as a pure public bad.
The ￿nal sectors, the research sector and the extraction sector are com-
petitive and pro￿t-maximizing. The intermediate goods producers are pro￿t-
maximizing monopolists. The households are price-takers and maximize
their intertemporal utility.
The public good character of knowledge, the public bad nature of the
stock of pollution and the monopolist structure of the northern intermediate
sector imply that three instruments are needed to make the equilibrium
Pareto optimal. Typically, those instruments will be a subsidy to the labor
employment in the research sector to internalize the positive e￿ects of spill-
overs, a subsidy to the use of intermediate goods by the ￿nal sectors and a
tax on the use of the natural resource. Generally, the ￿rst two instruments
will be time-invariant. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume the subsidy
to the employment of labor in research to be constant and ￿x the subsidies
to the use of intermediate goods at their optimal levels.
The Northern Final Sector
In what follows, the ￿nal good is chosen to be the numeraire of the economy.
Its price is normalized to unity.
















pN(j)(1 − sN)xN(j)dj − wNLY
N − pR(1 + θN)RN,
where pN(j) is the unit price of intermediate good j, sN is the unit subsidy
to the use intermediate goods in the North, wN is the wage rate in the
North6, pR is the unit price of the extracted resource and θN > −1 is the
unit ad valorem tax on the use of the resource. The behavior of this sector















where τN = 1 + θN > 0.
The Southern Final Sector
The program of this sector is similar to that of the northern ￿nal sector.
However, there is no need of subsidy to the use of intermediate goods in
the South since, due to the absence of intellectual property enforcement, the
intermediate monopolists in competition with competitive pirates, are forced
to sell their output at marginal cost7.

















S − pR(1 + θS)RS,
where the variables introduced here with a subscript S have the same mean-
ing than those introduced in the previous subsection but transposed to the
South.
6As the labor markets are segmented due to the ￿xity of this factor, there are two
wages in the economy.
7In other words, the optimal subsidy is zero. We will come back to this point in the
next subsection.
















where τS = 1 + θS > 0.
The Intermediate Sector
Each innovation is protected by a patent which gives rise to a monopoly
position in the intermediate sector. Note that since there is no enforcement of
intellectual property rights in the South, this monopoly cannot earn anything















is the demand for the intermediate good j by the northern
￿nal sector.




, ∀j ∈ [0,A], (3.10)
which happens to be independent of j, while the intermediates are sold at
their marginal cost in the South8:
pS(j) = 1,∀j ∈ [0,φA], (3.11)


















No pro￿t is made on xS. The whole spot pro￿t of an intermediate producer






8The northern monopolists are indi￿erent between selling to the South and letting the
pirates produce. For convenience, we will assume all along that the intermediates are
produced in the North. As no rent can be extracted from the ￿rms using intermediates in
the South, our results are robust to an alternative assumption.
10The Research Sector







t r(u)du ds, (3.14)
where r is the interest rate. The existence of several assets implies that their
rates of return must be equal in equilibrium. Indeed, by log-di￿erentiating
(3.14), we get:







The pro￿t function of the research sector is πR = ˙ AV − wA(1 − σ)LR
A,
where σ is the subsidy rate to the employment of researchers. Free-entry in














t r(u)du ds, (3.17)
subject to
˙ Q(t) = −R(t), Q(0) = Q0 given. (3.18)
The owners of the stock manage it like an asset. That is why the latter




, t ∈ [0,+∞). (3.19)
In equilibrium, the extractor must be indi￿erent between selling one extra
unit at some date and leaving this unit underground to sell it at any later
date.
Households’Optimization
The households living in both countries, i = N,S, maximize their intertem-











9We explicitly rule out Ponzi games by imposing (3.22).
11subject to





0 r(s)ds = 0, (3.22)
where Hi captures all lump-sum transfers to the country i households. This
term includes funding of public subsidies and sharing of tax revenues and
pro￿ts of local ￿rms, that is10, HS = pR(RN + RS) + θSpRRS and HN =
θNpRRN −pNsNAxN −σwNLA
N
11. Bi is the country i’s net stock of ￿nancial
assets.





e−ρt, − ˙ λi = rλi, (3.23)
which implies the following Ramsey-Keynes conditions:
gci = r − ρ, i = N,S. (3.24)
3.2 Decentralized Equilibrium Outcome
In this subsection, we characterize the general equilibrium of the economy
described above.
In order to get analytical results, we have to make a couple of assump-
tions. First, we assume that the local environmental tax rates, τN and τS,
evolve according to the same growth rate. Second, we assume that the subsidy
to the use of intermediate goods, sN, is ￿xed at its optimal level. Looking at
(3.2) and (3.10) and noting from (2.4) that the marginal cost of producing an
intermediate good is 1, we get so
N = 1−α. Formally, these two assumptions
write:
gτN(t) = gτS(t) = gτ(t) > −ρ, for all t ∈ [0,+∞) and sN = so
N = 1 − α.
(3.25)
Later, we show that the former assumption holds in ￿rst-best equilibrium 12.
In this context, the following proposition presents the equilibrium solu-
tion.
10The computation of those terms is detailed in appendix B where all the ￿ows of uses
and resources of all agents are written from their respective budget constraints.
11The way these two terms enter the representative households’ problems supposes that
the sharing of net governments’ budgets and positive local rents is symmetric. This as-
sumption implies that the current paper does not consider local inequality and intra-
country transfers.
12We have also solved a particular case in which gτN 6= gτN, and one of the no-Ponzi
game conditions (3.22) was not veri￿ed.
12Proposition 2 The set of equilibrium paths is characterized by the following







N = LN − LY
N, LY



























gAN = gAS = gA = ψLA
N, (3.29)
gRN(t) = gRS(t) = gR(t) = −ρ − gτ(t), (3.30)













Given the above rates of growth, the respective national productions and
















































0(ρ+gτ(s))ds dt > 0.
Proof of proposition 2 See appendix C.
Proposition 2 is the equilibrium counterpart of proposition 1 for opti-
mum.
The e￿ects of the common growth rate of the environmental taxes, gτ, on
the dynamics of the economy are drastic. Indeed, from equation (3.30), one
immediately sees that a decrease in gτ implies that the society postpones
the extraction, i.e. gR increases. This in turn favors an increase in the
growth rate of the other un￿xed inputs and particularly the quantity of each
13kind of intermediates, i.e. gx increases (see equation (3.32)). In ￿ne, this
enhances growth of output and consumption, i.e. gYN, gYS, gCN and gCS
increase (see equation (3.31)). Actually, a modi￿cation in the growth rate
of the environmental tax leads to a change in the rate of growth of the price
for resource. This provides the incentives for the ￿nal sectors to use more
resource at some times and less at some others. Eventually, this explains
why the time-pro￿le of the tax a￿ects the extraction path.
The e￿ects of the levels of both environmental taxes, τN(t) and τS(t),
however, are rather di￿erent from those of their time-pro￿le. First, one can
see that the ratio of the tax rates determines the geographic repartition of the
production. Namely, equation (3.27) tells us that the higher the northern tax
rate relatively to southern one, the lower the northern production relatively
to the southern one. The existence of a world market for the resource implies
that the seller price, pR, is the same in all countries. Because of the local
environmental taxes, however, the price of the resource faced by the ￿rms
is allowed to di￿er across countries. By this way, the levels of those taxes
a￿ect the respective outputs in North and South. Eventually, equations
(3.35) and (3.36) tell us that this channel determines partly northern and
southern consumption level since they depend on the local productions.
Second, from the later equations, one can see that the levels of the tax
rates enter the northern and the southern consumption directly: the local
outputs being taken as given, the northern environmental tax level in￿u-
ences the respective consumptions. Actually, the northern tax rate a￿ects
the pro￿ts from extracting the resource and consequently the northern tax
revenues. Those amounts being shared among the local residents, the north-
ern tax rate determines in this way the two consumptions of northern and
southern households.
Finally, the tax levels have no e￿ect on the dynamics of the economy.
This is rather surprising. Indeed, we just saw that the environmental tax
levels together in￿uence the geographic repartition of the world production.
It is worth reminding here of the asymmetric degrees to which the intellectual
property rights are enforced in the present North-South model. We argued
previously that the market value of an innovation (of a patent) corresponds,
in discounted terms, to what will be earned from the sales of the associated
intermediate good. These sales are pro￿table only in the North. A reloca-
tion of the ￿nal sector towards the South being accompanied by an increase
in the relative quantity used in the South of each intermediate good (See
equation (3.27)), the value of an innovation is a￿ected by the repartition
of the productive activities among North and South. However, the alloca-
tion of the northern labor among the ￿nal sector and the research sector is
independent of the local tax levels. The reason why it is the case is that
a change in the size of the northern production, YN, results in changes in
the productivities of the researchers and the employees of the ￿nal sector by
the same proportion so that no reallocation of the northern labor is needed
14after a relocation13. Formally, equations (3.3) and (3.16) show us how these
productivities depend on YN.
3.3 Optimal Policies
By comparing the decentralized outcome and the utilitarian social planner
ideal presented in section 2, we can now get the conditions under which the
equilibrium is optimal.
Proposition 3 Four instruments (sN, σ, {τN(t)}t≥0 and {τS(t)}t≥0) are






N = 1 − α,










for all t ∈ [0,+∞), then an equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Proof of proposition 3 See appendix C.
Since the optimality of the subsidy to the use of the intermediates has
been assumed from subsection 4.1 on, one can refer to the comments on this
point in this subsection.
As concerns the optimal subsidy to the labor employment in the research
sector, note that it takes into account how knowledge di￿uses to the South.
Formally, one can see from proposition 3 that σo is increasing in LA
N
o while
equation (2.12) tells that this quantity of labor is increasing in the index
of southern development, φ. Because of the non-enforcement of intellectual
property rights in the South, the northern investment in the research sector
does not depend on the di￿usion of knowledge. The subsidy σo aims in
particular at making the North internalize the usefulness of the innovations
for the southern ￿nal sector.
Let us now focus on the optimal environmental tax policy. The role of
the tax rates is twofold.
First, the equality of both tax rates, τN(t) and τS(t), for all t ∈ [0,+∞),
is required for optimality. Indeed, this equality ensures that the resource
marginal productivities in both countries are equal (see equations (3.4) and
(3.8)), which is a necessary condition for static e￿ciency. However, the
common level of both local tax rates plays no role in the correction of the
environmental externality.
13This rather striking property strongly relies on the unitary price-elasticity of the
demands for labor from the research and the ￿nal sectors due to the Cobb-Douglas spec-
i￿cations. That is why, we guess, this result is not so general. Anyway, it simpli￿es a lot
the analysis by making a part of the model behave regularly.
15Second, what counts is that this common tax rate evolves according to the
growth rate gτ
o. As we argued in the previous subsection, the time-pro￿le of
the tax is the relevant instrument to make the society extract more resource
at some times and less at some others. As a result, the optimal environmental
tax is de￿ned up to an homothecy. Formally, if τ(t), t ∈ [0,+∞) is optimal,
then kτ(t), t ∈ [0,+∞), k > 0 is also optimal14.
The later result is not new. We can refer to Sinclair (1992), Ulph and
Ulph (1994) and Groth and Schou (2006) for instance in which the same
kind of property is presented. More generally, the same result arises in a
model where the households are a￿ected by the ￿ow of pollutants like in
Grimaud and RougØ (2005) rather than their accumulation over time in the
atmosphere. However, these integrated models do not allow to highlight that
the level of the tax has to be the same all around the world.
About the optimal time-pro￿le of the environmental tax, note ￿nally
that gτ
o is unambiguously negative in our model. However, go
τ > −ρ since
go
τ = −ρ − go
R from equation (3.30) and go
R < 0. The negativity of the
optimal tax growth rate means that the existence of the pollution externality
renders it optimal to postpone the extraction with respect to the laissez-faire
equilibrium. It is worth noting that such a result is in accordance with the
recommendations of the Kyoto protocol. This result that the optimal tax
must decrease to implement the optimum allocation of the polluting resource
over time is conform to the results of Sinclair (1992), Grimaud and RougØ
(2005) and Groth and Schou (2006). We have to notice that this aspect
of the optimal tax is not robust to the introduction of a rate of decay of
the stock of pollutants in the atmosphere. We refer here to Ulph and Ulph
(1994). Anyway, even in such an extension, the level of the tax does not
help correcting the pollution externality, i.e. a constant tax rate, as high as
it can be, won’t a￿ect the extraction path.
In the two later subsections, we argue that the e￿ects of the environmen-
tal tax rates are of two categories. We identify clearly the levels e￿ects and
the growth rate e￿ects. To be clear about what we are going to focus on, let
us insist on the vocabulary used from now on. A tax policy is represented by
a function of time, τ(t), for all t ∈ [0,+∞). Restricting attention to functions
that are continuous, any tax pro￿le {τ(t)}+∞
t=0 is completely characterized by
ı) an initial level, τ(0), and ıı) a rate of growth pro￿le, {gτ(t)}+∞
t=0. From
now on, by considering a change in the tax level, we refer to a change in the
initial level, the growth rate pro￿le remaining unchanged, that is to say a
homothetic transformation of the whole tax pro￿le, i.e. the substitution of
τ(t) by kτ(t), k > 0, for all t ∈ [0,+∞).
14In particular, an optimal tax rate can be lower than unity. In other words, the
optimum can be implemented through the use of a subsidy.
163.4 Qualitative Analysis of the North-South E￿ects of Envi-
ronmental Policy
After the analysis of the role of environmental taxation policy in equilibrium
we presented above, one can have worthwhile intuitions on the North-South
e￿ects of environmental policies.
It may be worth recalling that in order to get analytical results, we re-
strict our study to the case of a common rate of growth of both environmental
local tax pro￿les. In this context, we have seen that the time-pro￿le of the
tax rates does not a￿ect the split of world output between northern and
southern households at any date but that the common evolution of this pro-
duction and both local consumptions as time goes by. Then, we are going to
focus on the impacts of changes in the tax levels, τN(0) and τS(0), holding
their common growth rate unchanged.
On the one hand, we have explained the direct presence of the northern
tax rate in the expressions of the respective consumption levels (3.35) and
(3.36) by the fact that this rate a￿ects the resource exploiter pro￿ts and
the northern tax revenues. By this way, the northern environmental policy
entails North-South transfers and results in changes in both local consump-
tions. In the next section, we argue that this rent extraction channel leads to
a pure redistributive e￿ect. Indeed, it can be isolated from any distortional
e￿ect. Bergstrom (1982) focuses accurately on this channel.
On the other hand, we have seen from equations (3.33) and (3.34) that the
tax rates a￿ect the local productions. We have explained above that the story
behind this dependence has much to do with relocation of the ￿nal sectors
consecutive to changes in the relative prices for resource in both countries.
We will refer to this channel as the relocation channel. Its e￿ects are twofold.
First, proposition 3 tells us that the equality of both environmental tax rates
ensures partly global e￿ciency. A departure from this equality, or more
generally a unilateral change in one of both tax rates, then distorts the world
economy. In the next section, we will see that it actually a￿ects the size of
world production and thus necessarily southern and northern consumption.
Second, the expressions of the consumption levels (3.35) and (3.36) depend
on the local outputs. Hence, the world production being unchanged (i.e.,
even without e￿ciency distortion), the location of the output production
also a￿ects both local consumptions. That is why the relocation channel
leads in particular to redistributive e￿ects.
Figure 2 sums up this point about the di￿erent kinds of North-South
e￿ects resulting from environmental policy.
17Environmental tax 






Figure 2: Typology of the North-South effects of 
environmental policy.
4 Environmental Policies, Rent Extraction and Re-
location
4.1 The Rent Extraction: A Pure Transfer
Here we characterize the e￿ects of rent extraction. To do so, we have to be
careful to isolate these e￿ects from those of relocation. We have seen above
that the geographic repartition of the output production only depends on
the tax ratio τN/τS. Hence, restricting the analysis to changes in the tax
levels τN(0) and τS(0) holding the latter ratio unchanged allows us to get
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 A proportional increase in both the northern and the south-
ern tax levels does not entail any relocation, does not a￿ect the world pro-
duction, increases the northern consumption and decreases the southern one
at each date.
Formally, let us consider k ∈ IR∗
+ and (τN(0),τS(0)) ∈ (IR∗
+)2 such that
τN(0)




S (t),Y τ(t)}t≥0 be the local consump-
tions, the local productions and world production pro￿les in equilibrium un-





S (t),Y τ+∆(t)}t≥0 be the local consumptions, the local productions and
world production pro￿les in equilibrium under the initial tax levels τN(0) +
∆τN(0) and τS(0)+∆τS(0) where
∆τN(0)














i (t) = Y τ
i (t), i = N,S
Y τ+∆(t) = Y τ(t)
, for all t ∈ [0,+∞). (4.1)
Proof of proposition 4 See appendix D.
18Proposition 4 con￿rms the intuitions evoked in the previous section.
Changes in the tax levels that do not entail relocation of the ￿nal sectors, do
not a￿ect the world production but only its sharing between both countries.
That is to say that such changes are purely redistributive. Proportional in-
creases of both tax levels do not a￿ect the e￿ciency of the economy, reduce
the exploiter rent and increase the northern tax revenues. Actually, since a
proportional increase in both tax levels does not entail relocation, we can
see from equations (3.4) and (3.8) that this increase implies a decrease in
the price for resource, pR, by the same proportion. As the pro￿ts and tax
revenues were assumed to be shared equally among the southern households
and the northern ones respectively, the rent capture induced by the taxation
policy a￿ects both local consumption levels.
Since pollution is a public bad and preferences are assumed to be sym-
metric, the utility functions of the northern and southern households di￿er
only by the consumption arguments. Hence it follows from proposition 4
that increases of both tax levels by the same proportion make the northern
households better-o￿ and the southern ones worse-o￿.
In particular, proposition 4 holds also in ￿rst-best equilibrium i.e. when
the instruments are set at their optimal levels (from proposition 3, sN = so
N,
σ = σo, τN = τS = τ and gτ(t) = go
τ(t) for all t ∈ [0,+∞)). In this context,
proportional changes in both tax levels result in a move along the ￿rst-best
frontier in favor of either the northern or the southern households. This
move is equivalent to the one resulting from a variation of the weights the
social planner gives to northern and southern households, δ and 1 − δ.
4.2 Relocation and Global Ine￿ciency
Now we want to characterize how e￿ciency is a￿ected by the the tax levels,
τN(0) and τS(0). We know from proposition 3 that the equality of these
latter levels is required to make the equilibrium optimal. We study here how
world production is a￿ected by changes in the tax levels more generally.
From now on, we will focus on the e￿ects of the northern tax level. The
following proposition is presented this way. However, both tax levels have
a symmetric role in the distortion of the economy arising after a change in
one of them since the relevant variable a￿ecting the world production is the
tax ratio τN/τS.
19Proposition 5 World production is maximal when the northern and south-
ern tax levels are equalized. An increase in the former leads to a relocation
of the ￿nal sectors ￿ a decrease in the northern production and an increase
in the southern one. Accordingly, such an increase yields a global e￿ciency
distortion ￿ an increase (decrease) in the world production if and only if the
northern tax level is lower (larger) than the southern one. Formally,
( ∂YN(t)




∂τN(0) > (resp <)0 if and only if τN(0) < (resp >)τS(0),
(4.2)
for all t ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof of proposition 5 See appendix D.
We have seen above that changes in the relative tax level result in changes
in the price for resource paid by both ￿nal sectors and accordingly, in equilib-
rium, in a relocation of these sectors accompanied by changes in the marginal
productivities of the resource in both countries. Static e￿ciency requires
that these productivities are equal. Thus it is not surprising that a unilat-
eral increase of one tax level a￿ects the world production. More generally,
proposition 5 tells us that this latter production expressed as a function of
the northern tax level is concave and reaches its maximum at τN(0) = τS(0).
4.3 Rent Extraction and Relocation: Who Gains?
Environmental policies cause relocation in production. This in particular
a￿ects the global e￿ciency of the world economy. This also a￿ects local
outputs and consumption levels in both regions. Proposition 5 tells us how
the size of the cake is determined. However, it tells nothing about its split
between North and South.
Here, we will examine the ￿nal e￿ects of environmental policy on northern
and southern consumption. As in the later subsection, we restrict the study
to the impacts of the northern tax level. To do so, we use the expressions
for consumption presented in equations (3.35) and (3.36) and see how these
consumption levels react to a change in the initial northern tax level, the
southern one being given.
We know from the latter section that a change in the tax levels that
implies some relocation a￿ects the value of an innovation. This will a￿ect in
turn the equilibrium on the ￿nancial market. The initial split of the bonds
between North and South given by B(0) = BN(0) + BS(0) is arbitrary15.
15What is required for equilibrium is that the initial total amount of bonds, B(0) =
BN(0)+BS(0), equals the ￿nancial demand of the intermediate sector to buy the patents,






oxN(0), which depends on the tax ratio τN/τS through
xN(0). Given this amount B(0), its initial distribution between North and South is arbi-
trary.
20Then, a change in BS(0) induced by a relocation is also arbitrary, i.e. we
cannot say what division of the bonds a change in the initial amount B(0)
will lead to. For simplicity, we assume in what follows that BS(0) = 016.
In appendix D, we de￿ne three thresholds from which we can examine
how the two local consumptions, CN(t) and CS(t), react to an increase in
the northern tax level, τN(0), for a given τS(0). First, the constant level















































will allow us to get the sign of ∂CS(t)/∂τN(0). The impacts of the northern
tax level on consumption levels depend on the initial tax rates τN(0) and
τS(0). These impacts are completely described in proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6 An increase in the northern tax level leads to an increase
(respectively decrease) in the northern consumption at each date if the south-
ern tax level is relatively high (respectively low). It leads to a decrease (re-
spectively increase) in the southern consumption at each date either if the
southern tax level is low or if the northern one is relatively low (respectively
high).
Formally,
(ı)(a) If τN(0) ≤ ρD, then CN(t) is strictly increasing in τN(0) for all dates
t ≥ 0.




> 0 such that CN(t) is strictly
increasing (resp decreasing) in τN(0) for all dates t ≥ 0 if and only if τS(0) >





(ıı)(a) If τS(0) ≤ ρD, then CS(t) is strictly decreasing in τN(0) for all dates
t ≥ 0.




> 0 such that CS(t) is strictly






Proof of proposition 6 See appendix D.




such that the northern consumption
is constant is de￿ned by equation τS(0) = b τS(τN(0)) in (4.3). We re-
fer to this set as the "CN constant" curve. Similarly, the set of points
16Without imposing this assumption, the next results would have been the same condi-




such that the southern consumption is constant is de￿ned by
equation τN(0) = c τN(τS(0)) in (4.4). We refer to this set as the "CS con-
stant" curve. In appendix D, we show that these later curves cross once.
Moreover, their point of intersection is such that τN(0) = τS(0): see point
X in ￿gure 3. The "CN constant" curve is above the ￿rst bisecting line
from τS(0) = 0 to τS(0) = τX. Beyond, the former is below the latter. The
"CS constant" curve is above the "CN constant" curve from τS(0) = ρD to
τS(0) = τX. Beyond, the former is below the latter.
Both the "CN and CS constant" curves help us know whether the con-
sumptions CN and CS increase or decrease after an increase in the northern





the analysis, let us remind that, from proposition 5, the ￿rst bisecting line
indicates for which initial levels the world production, Y , rises or falls when
the northern tax level increases.
Finally, combining the results of propositions 5 and 6, ￿gure 3 sums up
the e￿ects of an increase in τN(0) on CN, CS and Y .
Above the "CN constant" curve, an increase in the northern tax level,
τN(0), a￿ects the northern consumption, CN, negatively at all dates. Below
this curve, such an increase a￿ects this consumption positively. On the left of
the "CS constant" curve asymptote and below this curve, an increase in the
northern tax level, τN(0), a￿ects the southern consumption, CS, negatively
at all dates. Above this curve, such an increase a￿ects this consumption
positively. Finally, from the later subsection, one knows that an increase in
the northern tax level, τN(0), makes the world production, Y , increase below
the ￿rst bisecting line and makes it decrease above.
Actually, rent extraction and relocation lead to a decrease in the oil
rent accruing to the South in counterpart of its exports, that is also the
resource payment by the North of its resource imports (pRRN). Moreover,
relocation makes the northern national revenue (YN) decrease relatively to
the southern one (YS). In sum, the e￿ects of an increase in the northern
tax level are ambiguous on both national consumptions. Roughly, if τN(0)
is high relatively to τS(0) (sector 2), an increase in the former tax level
bene￿ts the North and is detrimental to the South, and inversely (sector 5).
However, if the initial tax levels are absolutely low, then the redistributive
e￿ects from rent extraction prevail: if τN(0) < ρD, an increase in τN(0)
makes always increase the northern consumption and if τS(0) < ρD it makes
always decrease the southern one.
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Figure 3: Effects of an increase in the northern tax level (τN(0)) on 
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in sector 1, then CN(t) decreases,CS(t) decreases and Y (t) decreases,
in sector 2, then CN(t) decreases,CS(t) increases and Y (t) decreases,
in sector 3, then CN(t) decreases,CS(t) increases and Y (t) increases,
in sector 4, then CN(t) increases,CS(t) increases and Y (t) increases,
in sector 5, then CN(t) increases,CS(t) decreases and Y (t) increases,
in sector 6, then CN(t) increases,CS(t) decreases and Y (t) decreases,
(4.5)
at all dates t ∈ [0,+∞).
Since changes in the tax levels won’t a￿ect the growth rate of the economy
and because the only argument of the representative agents utility function
that can di￿er across countries is the consumption argument, the variations
23of the local consumptions described above can also be interpreted as varia-
tions in discounted utilities.
4.4 Strategic Governments and Nash Equilibrium
We have shown in the last subsection that the impacts of a northern unilat-
eral policy depend on the initial environmental tax levels in both countries.
So, in order to better understand these e￿ects, it is necessary to determine
these initial tax levels. To do this, we formalize the behavior of both coun-
tries and adopt a ￿scal competition approach.
We assume in this subsection that governments behave strategically.
Their objectives are per capita consumption in their respective countries
at date 0. Their strategic variables are respectively the tax levels τN(0) and
τS(0).
As noticed above, the variables τN(0) and τS(0) do not a￿ect growth
rates and thus maximizing Ci(0) amounts to maximizing Ci(t) for any t ≥ 0,
i = N,S. It actually amounts to maximizing the discounted utility Ui.
In this context, the best response function of the southern government is
the solution of the maximization of CS(0) as expressed in equation (3.36).
The best-response function of the northern government is given by the equa-
tion of the "CN constant curve" above as written in equation (4.3). These
best-response functions and the Nash equilibrium outcome are presented in
the following proposition:
Proposition 7 The best-response of the southern government is indepen-
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creasing function of the southern government strategy .



























Proof of proposition 7 See appendix D.
This Nash equilibrium is depicted in ￿gure 3 (point E). Note that, in
equilibrium, the northern tax rate is larger than the southern one. As a
consequence, this outcome is suboptimal.
The initial tax levels resulting from the Nash equilibrium are such that
an increase in the northern tax level has detrimental e￿ects on the world
economy. First, such an increase would worsen the global distortion due to
the resulting di￿erence in the tax rates. Consequently, the world production
would decrease. Second, southern countries endowed with depletable natural
resources would su￿er even more from rent extraction. Inversely, in this
24context, a decrease in the northern tax level would improve world e￿ciency
and increase consumption in the southern countries.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we set up a North-South endogenous growth model in which
the South is endowed with the entire stock of an essential, non-renewable,
polluting resource and in which world economic growth is driven by a north-
ern research sector. As the resource is burnt in both northern and southern
￿nal sectors, the consequent instantaneous ￿ows of pollution accumulate in
a stock which is a world public bad.
We have characterized the set of Pareto optima. Implementing an opti-
mum allocation in equilibrium requires the use of several policy tools: the
standard ones in endogenous growth theory, and furthermore, the national
environmental taxes. Conditional on their equality, the levels of the environ-
mental taxes do not matter. However, their common rate of growth should
be such that the paces of resource depletion and pollution accumulation are
optimal.
More generally, we have studied the e￿ects of the environmental policy in
equilibrium. We have shown that only the time-pro￿le of the environmental
taxes has dynamic e￿ects. Subsequently, we have examined the e￿ects of
the tax levels, their growth rates being unchanged: in other words, we have
considered homothetic transformations of the whole tax pro￿les. We have
isolated the redistributive e￿ects of rent extraction: higher taxes transfer the
mining rent from South to North. However, the e￿ects of relocation of ￿rms
limit the opportunity of North to extract this rent.
We have focused particularly on the e￿ects of an increase in the northern
tax level on northern and southern consumption. These e￿ects depend on
how high the environmental tax levels in North and South are initially.
Starting from the ￿scal competition Nash equilibrium, we ￿nd that such
an increase diminishes the e￿ciency of the world economy and lowers con-
sumption and utility in southern resource-rich countries.
This analysis suggests that the redistributive e￿ects of environmental
policies should be taken into account in the design of the regional regulations.
Indeed, these policies entail North-South transfers that are likely to be large
in scale. Moreover, uncooperativeness in this area between North and South
policymakers can also lead to unfortunate global ine￿ciencies.
25A Appendix: Model and Welfare
Proof of proposition 1 Typically, the amount of each intermediate good
won’t depend on its identity. Due to the Inada conditions veri￿ed by the
common utility functions, the technical constraints will be binding and the
non-negativity constraints can be dropped. Then the optimization problem of



























˙ A = ψA(LN − LY
N), (A.3)
˙ Q = −(RN + RS), (A.4)
˙ E = −h(RN + RS). (A.5)
Let µY , µA, µQ and µE denote the present-value multipliers associated
respectively to the constraints (A.2)-(A.5). The ￿rst-order conditions derived
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˙ µQ = 0, (A.14)
δLNλe−ρt + (1 − δ)LSλe−ρt = −E ˙ µE. (A.15)
26The transversality conditions the problem must satisfy are:
lim
t→+∞
µA(t)A(t) = 0, (A.16)
lim
t→+∞
µQ(t)Q(t) = 0, (A.17)
lim
t→+∞
µE(t)E(t) = 0. (A.18)
a) From (A.8) and (A.9) we have that YS
YN =
φxS
xN while from (A.10) and
(A.11) we get that YS
YN = RS
RN . Combining those two equations with the re-




γ and YS = φAxS
αLS
βRS
γ, we get equation
(2.13).
b) Rewrite (A.2) as:
CN + CS + AxN + φAxS = YN + YS. (A.19)
Substituting in (A.19) the conditions (A.8) and (A.9) and rearranging we get
equations (2.14).
c) From (A.3), we have immediately (2.15).
d) Now, we show that LY
N is constant over time. Log-di￿erentiating
(A.12), we get ˙ µY /µY − ˙ µA/µA = gA+gLY
N −gYN. Log-di￿erentiating (A.6),
we get ˙ µY /µY = −gCN − ρ. Plugging this result into the previous equation,
we obtain − ˙ µA/µA = gCN +ρ+gA +gLY
N −gYN. From (A.12), we also have
µY /µA = ψALY
N/βYN. Substituting the expressions of − ˙ µA/µA and µY /µA
in (A.13) and simplifying by (2.14), we obtain:
gCN − gYN + gLY








where (YN + YS)/YN = (LY
N + φ(1−α)/βLS)/LY
N, from (2.13).
From (A.6), (A.7) and (2.14), we have gCN = gCS = gC = gY . Thus,
we have gCN − gYN = gY − gYN = ( ˙ YN + ˙ YS)/(YN + YS) − ˙ YN/YN =
˙ (YS/YN)/(1 + YS/YN). Using (2.13), YS/YN = φ(1−α)/βLS/LY
N, which
gives ˙ (YS/YN) = −φ(1−α)/βLSgLY
N/LY
N, the previous equation reduces to
gCN − gYN = −φ(1−α)/βLSgLY
N/(LY
N + φ(1−α)/βLS). Substituting this later
expression in (A.20) and de￿ning u = LY
N + φ(1−α)/βLS, we obtain the fol-












27From (A.12), the transversality condition (A.16), writes
limt→+∞ µY YN/LY
N = 0. Note that (1 − δ)CN(0)µY /LN + δCS(0)µY /LS
is a constant fraction of µY so that the transversality condition rewrites
limt→+∞[(1−δ)CN(0)µY /LN+δCS(0)µY /LS]YN/LY
N = 0. Using now (A.6)
and (A.7), the term in brackets is δ(1 − δ)e−ρt[CN(0)/CN + CS(0)/CS].
Since gCN = gCS = gC = gY , this term rewrites 2δ(1 − δ)e−ρte−
R t
0 gY (s)ds,
i.e. 2δ(1 − δ)e−ρtY (0)/Y . Finally, the transversality condition becomes
limt→+∞ YNe−ρt/(Y LY
N) = 0. Using that Y = YN +YS and equation (2.13),
this eventually yields: limt→+∞ e−ρt/u(t) = 0.
From (A.21), limt→+∞ e−ρt/u(t) = 1/u(0)−(1−α)ψ/(βρ). Then, from
the transversality condition, u(0) = βρ/((1−α)ψ), which is the steady-state
value of u. Hence, LY
N jumps also at date 0 to its steady-state value given by
(2.12).
e) Substituting (A.6) in (A.10), we get µQ+hµE = γδLNe−ρtYN/(CNRN).
Combining this result with (A.15), we ￿nd ˙ µE/(µQ+hµE) = −λ(δLN +(1−
δ)LS)CNRN/(γδLNYNE). Using now that from (A.6) and (A.7),
(1 − δ)LSCN/(δLN) = CS, we ￿nally have: ˙ µE/(µQ + hµE) = −λ(CN +
CS)RN/(γYNE). from (A.10) and (A.11), we have YN/RN = YS/RS, and
thus YN/RN = Y/R. Moreover, from (2.14), C = (1 − α)Y . Finally, the
previous equation rewrites: ˙ µE/(µQ + hµE) = −λ(1 − α)R/(γE).
Log-di￿erentiating equation (A.10) after substituting µY from (A.6), we
get another expression of ˙ µE/(µQ + hµE). This expression is ˙ µE/(µQ +
hµE) = (gYN −gCN −gRN −ρ). Using (2.13) and the fact that LY
N is constant,
we have gYN = gYS = gY and gRN = gRS = gR. Moreover, from (2.14), we
have gY = gC, while we already know that gCN = gCS = gC. Then, equalizing
the left-hand side of both equations above, we get gR = (hλ(1−α)/γ)R/E−ρ.
Using now (A.5), we obtain gR = −λ(1−α)gE/γ−ρ. We then have equation
(2.16).
f) Log-di￿erentiating the production functions (2.1) in which xi(j) =
xi, i = N,S, one gets gYi = gA + αgxi + γgRi since gLY
i = 0. Log-
di￿erentiating (A.8) and (A.9), we have gxi = gYi − gA, i = N,S. (2.17)
and (2.18) follow.
g) From (A.6) and (A.7), we get (2.19).
h) We now turn to the study of the optimal dynamics. At each date t,
the Hotelling condition (2.16), gR = −ρ − λ(1 − α)gE/γ, has to hold. This
condition is represented by the straight line (HC) in ￿gure 4. Di￿erentiating
(2.16) with respect to time, we get: ˙ gR = −λ(1 − α) ˙ gE/γ.
From the formal de￿nition of the pollution accumulation (2.6), we have:
gE = −hR/E which is negative. Log-di￿erentiating this latter expression,
28we obtain:
˙ gE = gE(gR − gE). (A.22)
Thus, if gR = gE, then ˙ gE = ˙ gR = 0. And if gR > (<)gE, then ˙ gE < (>)0
and ˙ gR > (<)0.
The divergence towards a positive rate of extraction is ruled out by equa-
tion (2.17). Indeed, if at some date gR turned to be positive for ever, the
resource would be fully exhausted in ￿nite time. In such a case, there would
exist T ≥ 0 such that for any t ≥ T, Q(t) = R(t) = gR(t) = 0. Then, (2.17)
would become gY = ψLA
N
o > 0 while it is impossible due to the essentiality
of the resource factor17.
The two steady-states are depicted in ￿gure 4. The ￿rst one, SS1, where
gR = gE = −γρ/(γ+λ(1−α)), is unstable while the second one, SS2, where
gE = 0 and gR = −ρ is stable.
To sum up, at date t = 0, gE(0) ≥ −γρ/(γ + λ(1 − α)) and gR(0) ≤
−γρ/(γ + λ(1 − α)). From date t = 0 on, the economy converges to SS218.



















17See Blanchard and Fisher (1989) for a similar argument.
18An analytical determination of the convergence towards SS2 is not necessary for what
we do in this paper. However, it can be computed quite easily.














resource: pRRN (1 − α)AxN/α: subsidy to
taxes on resource use: θNpRRN the use of intermediates
intermediates: AxN/α
Research and
Uses intermediate sectors Resources
wages: wNL
A
N AxN/α: sales of intermediates
buying of ￿nal good: AxN  ˙ B: debt variation
interests: rB σwNL
A
N: subsidy to the em-
ployment of researchers
Uses Government Resources
subsidy to the use of intermedi-
ates: (1 − α)AxN/α
θNpRRN: environmental taxes




T: taxes on households
HN is the environmental tax revenue of the North minus the public expenses which are the
subsidies to the research sector and to the use of the intermediates. It can be negative or
positive and represents the contribution of the northern households to the public expenses.
SOUTH
Uses Households Resources
consumption: CS wSLS: wages
accumulation of assets: ˙ BS rBS: interests
HS = pR(RN + RS) + θSpRRS
Uses Firms Resources
wages: wSLS YS: sales
resource: pRRS
tax on resource use: θSpRRS
intermediates: φAxS
Uses Resource sector Resources
pro￿ts: pR(RN + RS) pR(RN + RS): sales
Uses Intermediate sector Resources
buying of ￿nal good: φAxS φAxS: sales
Uses Government Resources
redistribution: θSpRRS θSpRRS: tax revenue
Here, we see that HS is composed by the pro￿ts of the resource sector and the tax revenue
from the environmental tax. HS is non ambiguously positive.
30C Appendix: Equilibrium, Public Policies and Pareto
Optimality
Proof of proposition 2 We assume that sN = so
N = 1 − α and sS = so
S =
0. Moreover, we restrict to the case of a constant relative environmental tax.
Formally, we assume all along that gτN(t) = gτS(t) = gτ(t) > −ρ which
implies that τN(t)/τS(t) is constant over time.
a) Write the ratio of both production functions from (2.1) after noting
that, from (3.12), xi(j) = xi, i = N,S. Compute the ratio of the resource
quantities used by each ￿nal sector from equations (3.4) and (3.8). Using
(3.2) and (3.6) after replacing the equilibrium prices given by (3.10) and
(3.11), write the ratio of xS/xN. Combining these three ratios, we ￿nd con-
dition (3.27).
b) (3.12) can be written αYN/xN = A and αYS/xS = φA. Substituting
these conditions in (2.9) leads to C = (1 − α)Y , which gives (3.28).
c) From (2.2), we immediately have (3.29).
d) We now show that LY
N is constant over time.
Combining (3.13) and (3.16) we get πIG/V = (1 − α)ψAxN/(α(1 −
σ)wN). Substituting wN from (3.3) and using AxN = αYN from above, we
￿nd πIG/V = (1 − α)ψLY
N/(β(1 − σ)). From (3.16), we also obtain that
gV = gwN − gA which gives from (3.3) gV = gYN − gLY
N − gA. Substituting
the later expressions of gV and πIG/V in (3.15) and replacing the rate of
interest with r = gC + ρ (from (3.24)), we get
gC + ρ = gYN − gLY
N − gA + (1 − α)ψLY
N/(β(1 − σ)). (C.1)
Due to equation (3.28), gC − gYN = gY − gYN = ( ˙ YN + ˙ YS)/(YN + YS) −






equation reduces to gC − gYN = −gLY
N/[1 + φ(α−1)/β(τS/τN)γ/βLY
N/LS] (in
the same way as in d) of appendix A). Replacing this and gA = ψ(LN −
LY
N) together in (C.1) and rearranging, we get: ˙ LY
N = −(ρ + ψLN)[LY
N +
φ(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/βLS] + [ψ + (1 − α)ψ/β(1 − σ)][LY
N + φ(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/β
LS]LY
N. De￿ning y = (LY
N + φ(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/βLS
−1, we eventually get
the following di￿erential equation: ˙ y =

ρ + ψLN +
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ψ + (1 − α)ψ/β(1 − σ)
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We show now that y jumps immediately to its steady-state value. By
(3.24), the transversality conditions (3.22) imply
limt→+∞ Bi(t)e−ρte−
R t
0 gC(s)ds = 0, i = N,S, what in turn implies:
limt→+∞(BN(t)+BS(t))e−ρte−
R t
0 gC(s)ds = 0. Note now that BN+BS = AV
from the equilibrium of the ￿nancial market. Using this and the free-entry




N = 0, and, since gC = gY from (3.28), this
implies limt→+∞ e−ρtYN/((YN + YS)LY
N) = 0, what can be expressed after
developing as limt→+∞ e−ρt/y(t) = 0, which is possible only if y(t) = y(0) =
[ψ+(1−α)ψ/β(1−σ)]/[ρ+ψLN+(ψ+(1−α)ψ/β(1−σ))φ(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/βLS],
∀t ≥ 0. Eventually, this is equivalent to say that LY
N jumps also at date 0 to
its steady-state value which is given in equation (3.26).
e) Next, we show how to obtain equation (3.30). Let us log-di￿erentiate
conditions (3.4) and (3.8). Using (3.24) and (3.19), we obtain gYi − gRi =
gCi + ρ + gτ, i = N,S. Combining those later equations and using that
gCN = gCS = gC = gY from (3.24) and (3.28), we get gYN + gYS − 2gY −
gRN − gRS = 2ρ + 2gτ, i = N,S. Since LY
N is constant, (3.27) implies that
gYN = gYS = gY and gRN = gRS = gR. From the previous equation, one also
gets gR = −ρ − gτ, that is (3.30).
f) The ￿rst two equalities in (3.31) results from (3.24), the third from
(3.28), the fourth and ￿fth from (3.27) and the fact that LY
N is constant. As
concerns the last one, the log-di￿erentiation of the functional form of both
production functions (2.1) in which xi(j) = xi, i = N,S and LY
N is constant
gives gYi = gA + αgxi + γgRi, i = N,S. The log-di￿erentiation of (3.12),
gxi = γgRi/(1 − α), i = N,S, and gRN = gRS = gR lead immediately to the
last equality of (3.31) and to (3.32).
g)Let us now show how we obtain equations (3.33) and (3.34).





= Q0. Then, R(0) is increasing in Q0 and independent from τN/τS. By
(3.27), we get RN(0) = R(0)[1+φ(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/β+1LS/LY
N]−1 and RS(0)
32= R(0)[1 + φ(α−1)/β(τS/τN)γ/β+1LY
N/LS]−1. Using the demands for inter-






S RS(0)γ/(1−α). Putting these quantities in the pro-





N]−γ/(1−α) and YS(0) = φA0αα/(1−α)LS
β/(1−α)R(0)γ/(1−α)
[1+φ(α−1)/β(τS/τN)γ/β+1LY
N/LS]−γ/(1−α), which are also expressions (3.33)
and (3.34).
h) We are now going to show how we obtain equations (3.35) and (3.36).
Substituting (3.7), (3.8) and (3.4) in the budget constraint of country S
representative household (3.21) and using θS = τS − 1, we ￿nd ˙ BS + CS =
(1 − α)YS + γYN/τN + rBS.
As the northern research sector is a net borrower and constitutes the only
group of agents the households can trade with on the ￿nancial market, the




αAxN + ˙ B, where B = BN + BS. Using this condition to
substitute the ˙ BN −rBN in the budget constraint of country N representative
agent and simplifying with equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.10), (3.12) and (3.25),
we get: − ˙ BS + CN = (1 − α)YN − γYN/τN − rBS.
Solving those two instantaneous budget constraints as ￿rst-order linear
di￿erential equations in BS, we obtain two intertemporal budget constraints










































0 r(s)ds dt + BS(0). (C.4)
Taking the limit as T → +∞ of those two equations, the terms on the far





[CN(t) + (1 − α)YN(t) + γYN(t)/τN(t)]e−
R t




[(1 − α)YS(t) − CS(t) + γYN(t)/τN(t)]e−
R t
0 r(s)ds dt. (C.6)
Finally, using from equations (3.24) and (3.31) that gCN = gCS = gYN =
33gYS = r − ρ and reminding that gτ(t) > −ρ, t ∈ [0,+∞), equations (C.5)
and (C.6) reduce to equations (3.35) and (3.36).
Proof of proposition 3 a) It is shown in the text of section 3 that the op-
timal subsidy to the use of intermediates equals 1−α in the North while such
an instrument is not required in the South since intermediates are sold at
their marginal cost of production in this country.
b) The optimal subsidy to the labor employment by the research sector can
be found out by equalizing the optimal quantity of labor used by this sector,
LA
N
o, given by equation (2.12), and the same quantity in equilibrium which
is given by equation (3.26).
c) The fact that the environmental tax levels must equalize to ensure the
e￿ciency of the world economy can be seen by comparing equations (3.27)
and (2.13). Note that this results actually from the equality of the marginal
resource productivities (see equations (3.4) and (3.8)).
d) Last, the optimal time-pro￿le of the environmental taxes is obtained by
equalizing the optimal rate of extraction, given by (2.16), and the equilibrium
rate of extraction, given by (3.30). Note that the optimal growth rate of
extraction, go
R, has been shown to be strictly negative. Hence, from equation
(3.30), we get that go
τ > −ρ.
D Appendix: Environmental Policies, Rent Extrac-
tion and Redistribution
Proof of proposition 4 a) From equations (3.33) and (3.34), it is straight-
forward that a proportional increase in both initial tax levels, τN(0) and τS(0),
i.e. a change in these initial tax levels their ratio remaining constant, does
not a￿ect both national productions, YN(0) and YS(0). Since such an in-
crease does not a￿ect the growth rate of these productions (see proposition
2), a proportional increase in both tax levels does not a￿ect the national pro-
ductions at all dates t ≥ 0. This implies immediately the same result for the
world production.
b) Using equations (3.35) and (3.36), let us now examine the e￿ects of
a proportional increase in both tax levels on the initial national consumption
levels, CN(0) and CS(0). Since such a change does not a￿ect the outputs,
its e￿ects on consumptions can be through the direct presence of τN(0) in
expressions (3.35) and (3.36) or through the initial stock of assets the south-
ern households are endowed with, BS(0). Let us show ￿rst that the ￿nancial
34market equilibrium is not a￿ected by a proportional increase in both initial
tax levels.
b) ı) At the ￿nancial market equilibrium, B(0) = A0V (0) where
V (0) =
R +∞
0 ((1 − α)/α)xN(t)e−
R t
0 r(s)ds dt (from (3.13) and (3.14)) and
xN(t) = xN(0)e
R t
0 gxN (s)ds. Note that gxN = r − ρ − ψLA
N by (3.24), (3.29),




N]−γ/(1−α), from g) of proof of proposition 2 in























which appears to depend only on the relative tax level. Indeed, LA
N and LY
N
from (3.26) and R(0), as characterized in g) of proof of proposition 2 in
appendix C, are independent of τN and τS. Hence, the sum of the national
endowments in bonds being unchanged by a proportional increase in both
initial environmental tax levels, the respective national endowments, BN(0)
and BS(0), must not be a￿ected by such a change.
b) ıı) Given that BS(0), YN(0) and YS(0) remain unchanged after an
increase in τN(0) and τS(0) by the same proportion, it turns out immediately
that CN(0) increases and CS(0) decreases consequently to such an increase.
In the same way as for productions, the considered change having no dynamic
e￿ect, both national consumptions react at all dates t ≥ 0 just as initial
national consumptions do.
Proof of proposition 5 Let us de￿ne the variable
χ = φ(1−α)/β(τN(0)/τS(0))γ/β+1LS/LY
N.
a) From expression (3.33), we get
YN(0) = A0αα/(1−α)LY
N




(1 + χ)−γ/(1−α)−1(γ/β + 1)χ/τN(0). Using α + β + γ and rearranging, this
reduces to ∂YN(0)/∂τN(0) = −(γ/β)(YN(0)/τN(0))(χ/(1 + χ)) < 0.
b) In the same way, from (3.34),
YS(0) = φA0αα/(1−α)LS
β/(1−α)R(0)γ/(1−α)(1 + χ−1)−γ/(1−α) and we ￿nd
∂YS(0)/∂τN(0) = (γ/β)(YS(0)/τN(0))(χ−1/(1 + χ−1)) > 0.
c) ı) From the previous results, ∂Y (0)/∂τN(0)
= ∂YN(0)/∂τN(0)+∂YS(0)/∂τN(0) = (γ/β)((YS(0)/τN(0))(χ−1/(1+χ−1))−
(YN(0)/τN(0))(χ/(1 + χ))). Then, ∂Y (0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0
⇐⇒ YS(0)(χ−1/(1+χ−1)) > (resp <)YN(0)(χ/(1+χ)) ⇐⇒ YS(0)/YN(0) >
(resp <)χ. Finally, using equation (3.27), developing χ and simplifying, we
￿nd ∂Y (0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0 ⇐⇒ τN(0) < (resp >)τS(0).
35c) ıı) Y (0) is strictly increasing in τN(0) on (0,τS(0)) and strictly de-
creasing on (τS(0),+∞) and is continuous in τN(0). Hence, Y (0) is maxi-
mum in τN(0) at τN(0) = τS(0).
d) Once again, since the initial levels, τN(0) and τS(0), have no dynamic
e￿ect, the previous results are valid for all dates t ≥ 0: ∂YN(t)/∂τN(0) < 0,
∂YS(t)/∂τN(0) > 0 and ∂Y (t)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0 ⇐⇒ τN(0) < (resp >
)τS(0), ∀t ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof of proposition 6 Besides other assumptions above, let us set, as
explained in subsection 4.3, that BS(0) = 0. Remind that τN,τS > 0.
a) From (3.35), we get ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) = (1 − α)∂YN(0)/∂τN(0) −
γρD(∂YN(0)/∂τN(0))/τN(0) + γρDYN(0)/τN(0)2. Using the de￿nition of
variable χ and a) in the proof of proposition 5 above, we have: ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0)
= −((1−α)γ/β)(YN(0)/τN(0))χ/(1+χ)+(γ/β)γρD(YN(0)/τN(0)2)χ/(1+
χ) + γρDYN(0)/τN(0)2 = [(χ/(1 + χ))YN(0)/τN(0)2][−(1 − α)γτN(0)/β +
γ2ρD/β+γρD(1+χ)/χ], where the sum of the last two terms between brack-
ets yields γρD/χ+(1−α)γρD/β. Hence, ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0 ⇐⇒
ρD/χ > (resp <)((1 − α)/β)(τN(0) − ρD). From this proposition, we can
see that:
ı) If τN(0) ≤ ρD, then @τS(0) > 0 : ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) < 0, since χ > 0.
Hence, if τN(0) ≤ ρD, then ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) > 0, ∀τS(0) > 0.
ıı) If τN(0) > ρD, ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0
⇐⇒ ρD(φ(1−α)/βLS/LY
N)−1τS(0)(1−α)/β > (resp <)((1−α)/β)(τN(0)(1−α)/β+1
− ρDτN(0)(1−α)/β)
⇐⇒ τS(0) > (resp <)[(1 − α)φ(1−α)/βLS/γρDLY
N]β/(1−α)[τN(0)(1−α)/β+1 −
ρDτN(0)(1−α)/β]β/(1−α) = b τS(τN(0)). By continuity, the curve de￿ned by
equation τS(0) = b τS(τN(0)) is the set of pairs (τN(0),τS(0)) along which
∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) = 0. Since the initial tax levels have no dynamic e￿ect,
∂CN(t)/∂τN(0) = 0 at all dates t ≥ 0 along this curve and ∂CN(t)/∂τN(0)
is of the same sign as ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0).
b) From (3.36), we get ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) = (1 − α)∂YS(0)/∂τN(0)
+ γρD(∂YN(0)/∂τN(0))/τN(0) − γρDYN(0)/τN(0)2. Using the de￿nition
of variable χ and a) and b) in the proof of proposition 5 above, we have:
∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) = ((1 − α)γ/β)(YS(0)/τN(0))χ−1/(1 + χ−1)
− (γ/β)γρD(YN(0)/τN(0)2)χ/(1 + χ) − γρDYN(0)/τN(0)2
= [(χ/(1+χ))YN(0)/τN(0)2][((1−α)γ/β)(τN(0)YS(0)/YN(0))(χ−1/(1+χ−1))
((1+χ)/χ)−γ2ρD/β−γρD(1+χ)/χ], where YS(0)/YN(0) = χτS(0)/τN(0)
by (3.27) and the sum of the last two terms between brackets is −γρD/χ−(1−
α)γρD/β. Hence, ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0 ⇐⇒ ((1 − α)γ/β)(τS(0) −
ρD) > (resp <)γρD/χ. From this proposition, we can see that:
ı) If τS(0) ≤ ρD, then @τN(0) > 0 : ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) > 0. Hence, if
τS(0) ≤ ρD, then ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) < 0, ∀τN(0) > 0.
36ıı) If τS(0) > ρD, ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0
⇐⇒ [(1 − α)φ(1−α)/βLS/βρDLY
N][τS(0)−(1−α)/β+1 − ρDτS(0)−(1−α)/β] >
(resp <)τN(0)−(1−α)/β
⇐⇒ τN(0) > (resp <)[(1−α)φ(1−α)/βLS/βρDLY
N]−β/(1−α)[τS(0)−(1−α)/β+1−
ρDτS(0)−(1−α)/β]−β/(1−α) = c τN(τS(0)). By continuity, the curve de￿ned by
equation τN(0) = c τN(τS(0)) is the set of pairs (τN(0),τS(0)) along which
∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) = 0. Since the initial tax levels have no dynamic e￿ect,
∂CS(t)/∂τN(0) = 0 at all dates t ≥ 0 along this curve and ∂CS(t)/∂τN(0) is
of the same sign as ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0).
c) We explain now that both curves de￿ned by τS(0) = b τS(τN(0)) and
τN(0) = c τN(τS(0)), called respectively the "CN constant curve" and the "CS
constant curve", cross only once and that their point of intersection is on the
￿rst bisecting line, i.e. such that τN(0) = τS(0).
Both equations τS(0) = b τS(τN(0)) and τN(0) = c τN(τS(0)) form a system
of equations with two unknowns. We look for its solution(s) in (τN(0),τS(0)) ∈
[ρD,+∞)2. After computation, we can verify that the unique solution of the
system is τN(0) = τS(0) = τX = (βρD/(1−α))φ−(1−α)/βLY
N/LS +ρD > ρD
(see ￿gure 3).
Proof of proposition 7 Remind that we have assumed BS(0) = 0 from
section 4.3 on.
a) From (3.36), we can write CS(0) = (1 − α)YS(0) + γρDYN(0)/τN(0).
Hence, ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) = (1−α)∂YS(0)/∂τS(0)+(γρD/τN(0))∂YN(0)/∂τS(0).
De￿ning χ = φ(1−α)/β(τN(0)/τS(0))γ/β+1LS/LY
N, just like in the proof of
proposition 5 above, we ￿nd that ∂YN(0)/∂τS(0) = (γ/β)(YN(0)/τS(0))χ/(1+
χ) and ∂YS(0)/∂τS(0) = −(γ/β)(YS(0)/τS(0))χ−1/(1 + χ−1). Substituting
these later results in the expression of ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) above, we immedi-
ately have that ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) > (resp <) ⇐⇒ −(1−α)(γ/β)(YS(0)/τS(0))
χ−1/(1 + χ−1) < (resp >)(γρD/τN(0))(γ/β)(YN(0)/τS(0))χ/(1 + χ). Mul-
tiplying both sides of the later inequality by τS(0)(1+χ)β/γ and rearranging,
we get ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) > (resp <) ⇐⇒ χ−1τN(0)YS(0)/YN(0) < (resp >
)γρD/(1−α). Recalling now from (3.27) that YS(0)/YN(0) = χτS(0)/τN(0),
we obtain: ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) > (resp <) ⇐⇒ τS(0) < (resp >)γρD/(1 − α).
By continuity, it appears that CS(0) is maximum in τS(0) when τS(0) =
γρD/(1 − α).
b) From proposition 6 (ı)(a), the tax level maximizing CN(0) is larger
than ρD, for any τS(0) > 0. Then, from proposition 6 (ı)(b), the tax level
τN(0) = c τN(τS(0)) maximizes CN(0).
c) Recalling that the initial tax levels have no e￿ect on the dynamics
of the economy, the initial tax level τi(0) maximizing Ci(0) is also the one
maximizing Ci(t) at all dates t ≥ 0, for any i = N,S. Moreover, looking at
37the utility functions of both representative agents in (2.10) and recalling that
the tax levels do not a￿ect the law of motion of E, note that it is equivalent
for government i to maximize Ui and consumption in country i at all dates,
i = N,S.
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